## UAB & Barcelona GSE

I am Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics and Economic History at the Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona and Affiliated Professor at the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. I work on the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty.

**This information may be outdated. Thank you for switching to my webpage: **

**http://sites.google.com/site/jgierlingerecon/**

johannes '.'gierlinger 'at'uab '.'es

## Positions

- since 2010: Assistant Professor, UAB
- 2005-2010: PhD, Toulouse School of Economics

## Research papers

**Betting under subjective uncertainty**

This paper shows that uncertainty aversion may cause equilibrium consumption to react to non-fundamental variables, even under identical beliefs and strictly convex preferences. Otherwise irrelevant variables may carry statistical information about the underlying probability model: controlling for fundamentals, their conditional distribution may be uncertain, thus, dependent on the true model. This correlation cannot be exploited through contingent claims on fundamentals. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the absence of mutually acceptable bets under maxmin, smooth, and variational preferences. The least stringent condition concerns economies with multiplier preferences (Hansen and Sargent, 2001; Strzalecki, 2011), where non-fundamental variables do not matter if (and only if) the approximated models agree on conditional probabilities.

**Matching to share risk without commitment **(with Sarolta Laczó)

This paper reconsiders matching to share risk by requiring insurance transfers to be self-enforcing. We consider a marriage problem (i.e., two-sided, one-to-one matching without search frictions) with imperfectly transferable utility in a dynamic setting. With efficient risk sharing within the household, every stable matching is negative assortative with respect to spouses’ risk attitudes (Chiappori and Reny, 2006; Legros and Newman, 2007). We study the robustness of this result when risk sharing within the household is partial due to lack of commitment. We show that stable matchings might be positive assortative. More risk-averse agents can be more attractive risk-sharing partners, because they can credibly promise larger insurance transfers.

**Socially efficient discounting under ambiguity aversion** (with Christian Gollier)

We provide sufficient conditions under which ambiguity aversion decreases the social discount rate when future consumption growth is uncertain. We identify two effects. The first is equivalent to a distortion of beliefs. This pessimism effect requires joint restrictions on the growth process and the agent’s preferences to be signed. The second effect is novel and similar to prudence under expected utility. We show that this decreases the rate if and only if preferences satisfy decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion. Calibrations suggest a net ambiguity effect between –2.5 and –4.5 percentage points for the rate at which cash flows occurring in 30 years should be discounted.

UAB, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa Edifici B Dept. Economia i Història Econòmica 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona) Spain